On February 18, 2010, the Southern California Chapter of the ION held a meeting, hosted by NavCom in Torrance, CA. 25 people were in attendance to listen to a presentation by Dr. David S. De Lorenzo of Stanford University GPS Research Laboratory. An abstract of the talk and a short biography follow, and the slides used during the meeting are available.
Capsule Biography of David De Lorenzo:
David De Lorenzo is a Research Associate in the Stanford University GPS Research Laboratory and an Engineer in the Research Group at Polaris Wireless. His current research is in navigation system security and integrity, software-defined radios, adaptive signal processing, and mixed-signal urban/indoor location estimation. He received the Ph.D. degree in aeronautics and astronautics from Stanford University and previously has worked for Lockheed Martin and for the Intel Corporation.
Abstract of David De Lorenzo’s Talk:
Slides: Trust and Authenticity of Navigation Systems
The threats to navigation system utility and integrity come from Mother Nature, in the form of perturbations such as atmospheric disturbances and multipath, from inadvertent faults within the system, for example satellite clock errors and maintenance outages, and from manmade sources, including unintentional interference and deliberate jamming. As satellite-derived position, navigation, and time services becomes more pervasive, and as the information so derived is relied upon to secure safety-critical operations or financially-sensitive transactions, there will be some applications for which it is economically justifiable to harden against malicious attack. There has been substantial work to date on GPS/GNSS integrity (particularly for aviation applications) and interference rejection (particularly for military systems) – this talk will focus on the emerging discipline of navigation system authenticity, trust, and non-repudiation. We will describe a novel processing architecture, similar in some sense to codeless or semi-codeless L1/L2 processing, that addresses these dual concerns: (1) when processing signals that I receive myself, how do I ensure their authenticity? and (2) when receiving an assertion from another party about the signals that they receive, how do I ensure the validity of their assertion?